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NOTES

(1) In the first place, it could be solved by holding that the
elementary facts of attestation required by the substantive law did
not exist, i. e., the will was not attested by two witnesses. Cherry
was a known living person. But "J. M. Gordon" was a mere
signature, and the stranger in the office was an unknown personality. Whether that was his real narhie, was not known. A fictitious
person cannot be an attester. One object of the Wills Act, in
requiring the presence of witnesses, is to provide testimony by
responsible persons; and the reason the law allows proof of a
deceased witness' signature to suffice is "the presumption that
what an honest man hath attested under his hand is true."8 The
attester must at least be a known person, not merely an anonymous
physical being.
On this theory, even assuming the truth of Cherry's testimony,
the will was not validly executed, because there was only one
valid attesting witness.
(2) But, on another theory, and assuming that the second
attester was a sufficient one, nevertheless it remained to prove his
signature. The settled law is that, when an attester is deceased
or cannot be found, his signature may and must be proved. But in
this case nobody knew "J. M. Gordon"; nobody could identify
the handwriting as that of a person calling himself J. M. Gordon
or as that of anybody else. Either the name was fictitious (not the
name of the person signing), in which case the attestation was void
(on theory (1) above); or the name was the signer's real name,
in which case the proof of his handwriting was lacking, and the
rule requiring such proof was not satisfied.
We are disposed to rest upon the former hypothesis. The
latter one is open to the objection that Cherry's testimony to seeing
the stranger sign in his presence is sufficient proof of his handwriting.
However, on one or the other of these theories the case could
have been disposed of, in rejecting the purporting will. The proposition relied upon in the opinion, viz., that two witnesses must
"prove" the will, was not needed to support the decision.
JoHN H. WIGMORE.

ZoNING--PowER oF BoARD To VARY.-[Illinois] The practical
effect of the decision in Welton v. Hamilton' is apt to be misunderstood, if read without reference to the legislative background
at the time of the decision and as subsequently changed. The
zoning law of Illinois (1921/3) provides for a board of appeals
with power to determine and vary the application of zoning regulations in harmony with their general purpose and intent and in
accordance with general or specific rules contained in the regulations.
6. Kirkpatrick, C. J., in Newbold v. Lamb (1819)
449.
1.

(1931)

344 Ill. 82, 176 N. E. 333.

2 Southard (N. J.)
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"Where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship in the
way of carrying out the strict letter of the ordinance the board of
appeals shall have the power in passing upon appeals to vary or modify
the application of any of the regulations or provisions of such ordinance
relating to the use, construction or alteration of buildings or structures
or the use of land, so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed,
public safety and welfare secured and substantial justice done."
This power of variation, which is a familiar feature of zoning
legislation, the court holds to be an invalid delegation of power
because it provides no rule or standard for the guidance of the
board other than its own uncontrolled discretion.
Upon the merits of the position taken by the Supreme Court
as a matter of constitutional law it is unnecessary to enlarge; the
writer of this note has expressed his views in a note in the
National Municipal Review of September 1931. While the case is
disposed of entirely on grounds of constitutional invalidity, the
court, in the course of the opinion makes the following significant
statement:
"In this particular case the board of appeals did not make any attempt to state what the difficulty or hardship was in the way of carrying
out the strict letter of the ordinance or in what respect the spirit of the
zoning ordinance might be observed, the publicf safety or welfare
secured and substantial justice done by the erection of the proposed
building. The board simply made the general finding that there is
unnecessary hardship, etc., and ordered the issue of the permit, and the
only thing decided is that the board of appeals thought a permit ought
to issue in this case in accordance with the plans submitted and in
violation of the express provisions of the ordinance but with no indication of the reasons why."
It appears from this, that by the application of general principles of administrative law, the court should have been able to
reverse the decision of the board of appeals upon the board's
own record or lack of record, applying the general rule that when
a board has power to make a determination, upon a hearing, there
must be record evidence sufficient to substantiate the decision
reached. Plainly the decision of the board could not stand this
test. This more conservative method of 'dealing with the case would
also have made the discretion of the board appear as one judicially
controllable as to its exercise; and the delegation of such a discretion, being a valuable and indispensable adjunct to the necessarily complex provisions of modern regulative legislation, should not
lightly be held to be invalid.
What is the effect of the decision? The varying power of the
board of appeals is gone, but the power of the city council to
amend the zoning ordinance must remain, since it is indispensable.
An amendment by the council may be as arbitrary as a variation
by the board of appeals. A court of equity can grant relief against
an arbitrary amendment; and it does so, not by declaring the power
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unconstitutional, but by declaring its exercise illegal, 2 precisely what
the court should have done in the present case.
Even subject to a judicial check on general equitable principles,
the power of amendment vested in the council is in its intrinsic
guaranties of conservative and fair exercise hardly superior, if
indeed it is equal, to an administrative power of variation. Or
rather, the amending power is equally capable of abuse, if there
are no better safeguards than those hitherto found in the amending
process. Legislation, even if controlled by a judicial veto power,
can hardly rival in effectiveness a semi-judicial administrative procedure. The question, then, remains whether the benefits of such a
procedure cannot be saved even under the decision in Welton v.
Hamilton.
The zoning ordinance in force when Welton v. Hamilton was
decided dealt very briefly with the subjects of the board of appeals
and of amendments, prescribing no safeguards for the board procedure, and only the most meagre safeguards for the amending
process. The original zoning ordinance of April 5, 1923, had been
very different in this respect. Section 29, entitled "Functions of the
Board of Appeals," had prescribed for variations a recommendation
by the board based upon a hearing, and carried into effect by an
amending ordinance, and had specified seventeen different grounds
for variation. It does not appear why this conservative procedure
was subsequently discarded. What is of importance, is that in view
of the new situation, the City Council has reinstated the provisions
of the former ordinance in substantially the original form. (See
Council Proceedings of July 20, 1931.) The decision in Welton v.
Hamilton will thus at least have the beneficial effect that a less
satisfactory will be replaced by a more satisfactory procedure. The
delegation declared unconstitutional disappears; the varying power
vested in the council is not only not a further delegation of power,
but it is also not a power left without guiding standards; the
constitutional objections that were found fatal in Welton v. Hamilton appear to have no applicati6n to the reenactment of the
original ordinance.
It is true that the safeguards that have been reinstated are
based upon ordinance only, and not on statutory requirement; but
the Supreme Court of Illinois has recently held that the city council
is bound by its own requirements, and that an ordinance passed in
contravention of such requirements is invalid. 3 Taking it altogether,
the law is now in a more satisfactory condition than it was before
the decision in Welton v. Hamilton.
ERNST FREuND.
2. Phipps v. Chicago (1930) 339 IlM. 315, 171 N. E. 289.

3. Cain v. Lyddon (1931) 343 Ill. 217, 175 N. E. 391.

